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I. INTRODUCTION
In a bizarre turn of events, Mikhail Sebastian found himself trapped on
American Samoa in December 2011.1 He was not trapped because he was
arrested or kidnapped, or any of the other reasons one might expect; rather,
Sebastian was trapped due to his stateless status.2 Sebastian, who had been
living in the United States for over fifteen years, took what he thought would
be a four-day vacation, and ended up pleading with the U.S. to allow him to
return to his home in Los Angeles.3
In 2004, Ibrahim Parlak, a Kurdish man, had been living in the U.S. for
over twenty years after being granted asylum in 1992.4 Parlak had married
an American woman. They had a daughter together, and he was the proud
owner of a café in a small town in Michigan.5 He was living the American
dream. But Parlak’s idyllic world was flipped on its head in July 2004, when
the Department of Homeland Security arrested Parlak, accused him of
falsifying his asylum documents, and threatened to deport him to Turkey.6
U.S. authorities revoked Parlak’s green card, and threw him in detention
pending his deportation.7
Tatiana Lesnikova, a sixty-one-year-old grandmother and piano teacher,
has been stateless and living in the U.S. for over twenty years.8 In 1992,
Lesnikova escaped with her youngest son from Ukraine, where she had been

1

Mikhail Sebastian, Stateless in the United States, WASH. POST (July 4, 2013), http://articl
es.washingtonpost.com/2013-07-04/opinions/40369698_1_travel-documents-turkmenistan-us-officials; see also NPR Staff, Stateless and Stranded on American Samoa, NPR (Oct. 7,
2012, 2:22 PM), http://www.npr.org/2012/10/07/162445840/stateless-and-stranded-on-americ
an-samoa.
2
Sebastian, supra note 1.
3
NPR Staff, In Limbo: Stateless Man Stuck on American Samoa, NPR (Dec. 29, 2012,
5:22 PM), http://www.npr.org/2012/12/29/168255952/in-limbo-stateless-man-stuck-on-ameri
can-samoa; Sebastian, supra note 1.
4
Stewart A. Swerdlow, The Man Without a Country, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 25, 2013,
4:41 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/stewart-a-swerdlow/the-man-without-a-country_1
_b_4160094.html; FREE IBRAHIM, http://freeibrahim.com/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2014).
5
Swerdlow, supra note 4; see also Alex Kotlowitz, The Politics of Ibrahim Parlak, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 20, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/20/magazine/20PRISON.html?pagewa
nted=print&_r=0.
6
Swerdlow, supra note 4; see also Kotlowitz, supra note 5.
7
Swerdlow, supra note 4.
8
Jason Dzubow, Help for the Stateless?, UNHCR REFUGEES DAILY (June 23, 2010, 4:01
AM), http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refdaily?pass=463ef21123&id=4c2441825; see
also Laurel Bowman, Human Rights Activists Focus on Stateless for World Refugee Day,
VOICE OF AMERICA (June 15, 2010, 8:00 PM), http://www.voanews.com/content/human-right
s-activists-focus-on-stateless-for-world-refugee-day-96509754/119749.html.
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persecuted for her political beliefs, and applied for asylum in the U.S.9 In
1997, Lesnikova’s application was denied; however, she had nowhere to be
deported, as neither Ukraine nor Russia recognized her as a national due to
their post-Soviet nationality laws.10
A stateless person is an individual who is not considered a national by
any State under the operation of its laws.11 A 2013 report by the Office of
the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that there
are at least ten million stateless individuals in the world today,12 with over
600,000 in Europe13 and an undetermined number living in the U.S.14 U.S.
law does not afford these individuals any protections, let alone the ability to
acquire any sort of permanent status.15 In the European Union, nationality
laws vary from country to country. Stateless persons are often denied crucial
benefits of citizenship, such as access to health services, education, and legal
employment.16 The international community has ignored such violations for
far too long. With no official status, stateless persons are deprived of their
basic human rights and are subject to deportation, imprisonment, or worse.17
Mikhail Sebastian eventually was allowed to go back to his home in the
United States—fifteen months later.18 By enlisting the help of attorneys and
9

Dzubow, supra note 8.
Id.
11
Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons art. 1, Sept. 28, 1954, 360
U.N.T.S. 130 [hereinafter 1954 Statelessness Convention]; see also Alison Harvey,
Statelessness: The “De Facto” Statelessness Debate, 24 J. IMMIGR. ASYLUM & NATIONALITY
L. 257, 259 (2010), available at http://citizenshiprightsinafrica.org/docs/IANL%f202010%20
De%20facto%20statelessness%20debate%20Alison%20Harvey.pdf.
12
UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, GLOBAL TRENDS 2012, DISPLACEMENT: THE
NEW 21ST CENTURY CHALLENGE 2 (2013), available at http://unhcr.org/globaltrendsjune2013/
UNHCR%20GLOBAL%20TRENDS%202012_V05.pdf [hereinafter GLOBAL TRENDS 2012].
13
EUROPEAN NETWORK ON STATELESSNESS, ANNUAL REPORT 2012/13, at 1, available at
http://www.statelessness.eu/sites/www.statelessness.eu/files/attachments/resources/ENS_2012
-13_Annual%20Report.pdf.
14
UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES & OPEN SOC’Y JUSTICE INITIATIVE,
CITIZENS OF NOWHERE: SOLUTIONS FOR THE STATELESS IN THE U.S. 1 (2012), available at
http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/citizens-of-nowhere-solutions-for-th
e-stateless-in-the-us-20121213.pdf; see also Jay Milbrandt, Stateless, 20 CARDOZO J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 75, 80–81 (2011) (“According to the U.S. State Department, data on statelessness is
so limited that the international community does not even know if the numbers are growing or
shrinking.”).
15
Citizens of Nowhere, supra note 14, at 1.
16
UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, GLOBAL REPORT 2012, at 16 (2013),
available at http://www.unhcr.org/51b1d61db.html.
17
Milbrandt, supra note 14, at 81 (“The stateless are the most vulnerable people in our
world—they are the trafficked, the oppressed, and the neglected.”).
18
Sebastian, supra note 1.
10
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various news organizations, as well as the UNHCR, Sebastian was able to
convince U.S. officials to allow him to return.19 But Sebastian remains
stateless today, living in constant fear of detainment with no available path
for obtaining permanent legal status.20
For Ibrahim Parlak, his American dream has become a nightmare.21
Turkey would not admit Parlak back into the country, and his applications
for residency in other countries have been denied.22 Eventually, following a
public outcry, Parlak was released “under a strict, supervised status.”23 This
status comes with severe limitations on Parlak’s freedom: “He cannot go
anywhere without permission. He must be on call from immigration service
at all times. He cannot leave the country. He must call in whenever asked,
no matter what time of the day or night.”24 Periodically, legislation to grant
Parlak citizenship is introduced in Congress but, thus far, these efforts have
been fruitless.25 Parlak remains in a limbo and expresses little hope of ever
obtaining a legal status in the U.S. again.26
Tatiana Lesnikova and her youngest son also remain stateless today.27 In
a 2010 interview with Laura Bowman, Lesnikova remarked: “To be
stateless . . . means to be nobody. We have no rights.”28 Lesnikova is unable
to travel to see her closest family members because she cannot obtain travel
documents.29 She is ineligible for social security even though she pays
taxes.30 She must check in with the Department of Homeland Security by
telephone once a month and in person every six months.31 And, on top of all
of this, she says that she still lives in fear of being “arbitrarily jailed” at any
moment.32
In evaluating the policies of the United States and the European Union,
Part II will provide additional background information on statelessness,
including how it has progressed over time, the early developments in the law,
and its potential impact. Part III will then provide the foundation for the
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

Id.
Id.
Swerdlow, supra note 4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Dzubow, supra note 8.
Bowman, supra note 8.
Dzubow, supra note 8.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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current legal framework for both the U.S. as well as the E.U., and discuss the
advantages and disadvantages of each. In conclusion, Part IV will examine
the most effective legal policy for the U.S. going forward and advocate for
the passage of comprehensive immigration reform.
II. BACKGROUND ON STATELESSNESS
Statelessness is a condition, caused by governments, that occurs when no
state recognizes a person as its citizen under the operations of its law.33
Effectively, such an individual is not entitled to the protections of any state.34
Statelessness can happen anywhere in the world, but how statelessness
effects an individual varies because legal regimes throughout the world differ
considerably.35
A. De Jure and De Facto Statelessness
Depending on the country, statelessness can occur in many different
situations, including: birth to stateless parents;36 when a state ceases to
exist;37 through transnational surrogacy agreements, which can leave a child
without citizenship due to conflicts of law;38 as well as situations where
individuals are unable to establish their nationality.39
There are two categories of statelessness: de facto and de jure.40 De jure
statelessness is when no state considers the individual to be a national based
on its own laws.41 This can occur when a state ceases to exist and there is no
successor state, a situation recognized by both the 1954 Convention on the
Status of Stateless Persons (the 1954 Statelessness Convention)42 and the
1961 Convention on Reducing Statelessness (the 1961 Statelessness

33

See 1954 Statelessness Convention, supra note 11; see also Milbrandt, supra note 14, at 81.
Statelessness, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/j/prm/policyissues/issues/c50
242.htm (last visited July 31, 2014).
35
Brad K. Blitz & Caroline Sawyer, Analysis: The Practical and Legal Realities of
Statelessness in the European Union, in STATELESSNESS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: DISPLACED,
UNDOCUMENTED, UNWANTED 284, 288 (Caroline Sawyer & Brad K. Blitz eds., 2011).
36
See discussion infra Part II.A.
37
Milbrandt, supra note 14, at 81.
38
Harvey, supra note 11, at 258.
39
Milbrandt, supra note 14, at 82.
40
Polly J. Price, Stateless in the United States: Current Reality and a Future Prediction, 46
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 443, 450 (2013).
41
Id.
42
1954 Statelessness Convention, supra note 11, art. 10.
34
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Convention).43 De facto statelessness, on the other hand, occurs when a
person is either denied diplomatic protection or assistance by their country
once they are outside of it,44 or is prevented from seeking it due to practical
considerations like fear of persecution.45 There are no real solutions for
either category as of yet in international law.46 Because de jure statelessness
occurs less frequently,47 de facto statelessness will be the primary focus of
this Note.
B. Theories of Citizenship
A state’s nationality laws are key factors in whether or not an individual
will become stateless.48 Each state has the power to determine its own
nationality laws, but such sovereignty makes it difficult to address
statelessness at an international level.49 In addition, this deference to states
may result in intentional discrimination against a particular group.50
The two most frequently used principles for granting citizenship are jus
soli and jus sanguinis,51 with some countries using both.52 Jus soli, meaning
“law of the soil,” refers to individuals who are born on state territory and are
entitled to the citizenship of that state.53 Jus sanguinis, which means “law of
blood,” refers to an individual who is entitled to the same citizenship of their
parents.54 This varies from country to country—the U.S. uses somewhat of a
mix of jus sanguinis and the rule of jus soli,55 while many European
countries use jus sanguinis.56 The use of jus sanguinis tends to be more

43
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness arts. 1–4, Aug. 30, 1961, 989 U.N.T.S. 175
[hereinafter 1961 Statelessness Convention]; see also Milbrandt, supra note 14, at 81–82.
44
Price, supra note 40, at 450; Harvey, supra note 11, at 261.
45
Milbrandt, supra note 14, at 82.
46
Caroline Sawyer, Stateless in Europe: Legal Aspects of De Jure and De Facto
Statelessness in the European Union, in STATELESSNESS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: DISPLACED,
UNDOCUMENTED, UNWANTED, supra note 35, at 69, 71–72.
47
Id. at 83.
48
Harvey, supra note 11, at 257.
49
Sawyer, supra note 46, at 70–71 (“The difficulty for international law solutions to
statelessness is that nationality and citizenship are both aspects of national sovereignty to be
defined by countries themselves.”).
50
Milbrandt, supra note 14, at 81.
51
Id. at 89–90.
52
Harvey, supra note 11, at 258.
53
Milbrandt, supra note 14, at 90.
54
Id.
55
Price, supra note 40, at 445.
56
Id. at 451–52.
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problematic in the sense that it can lead to many generations of stateless
persons, whereas jus soli limits statelessness to only one generation.57
C. Early Developments in International Law
Over the years, there has been a slow and steady development of
international law addressing state nationality and citizenship laws.
The 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the
Conflict of Nationality Laws (the Hague Convention) demonstrates the
emerging principle that a state determines its nationals under its own law.58
Article 1 of the Hague Convention asserts this principle and adds that such
laws “shall be recognised by other States in so far as it is consistent with
international conventions, international custom, and the principles of law
generally recognised with regard to nationality.”59 Article 2 states that the
nationality of an individual “shall be determined in accordance with the law
of the State.”60
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which was issued
in 1948, asserted the right to a nationality.61 The Declaration recognizes that
“everyone has the right to a nationality” as well as a right to not be
“arbitrarily deprived” of that nationality or denied the right to change it.62
Further, Article 14 of the UDHR asserts the right of individuals to seek and
enjoy asylum from persecution in other countries, but qualifies this right by
saying that it only applies to persecution, and not genuine prosecutions
arising from non-political crimes.63
Subsequently, in 1950, the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) was created.64 The U.N. General Assembly later
charged the UNHCR, through a series of resolutions, with the prevention and
57
Id. at 444–45 (“But at present this statelessness at least is limited to one generation,
because under existing practices of territorial birthright citizenship, the children of
unauthorized immigrants are automatically awarded U.S. citizenship at birth if born in the
United States.”).
58
Harvey, supra note 11, at 257.
59
Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws art. 1, 179
L.N.T.S. 89 (Apr. 13, 1930) [hereinafter Hague Convention].
60
Id. art. 2.
61
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 15, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR]; see also Blitz & Sawyer, supra note 35, at 3.
62
UDHR, supra note 61.
63
Id. art. 14; Citizenship Through Parents, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES,
http://www.uscis.gov/us-citizenship/citizenship-through-parents (last visited Oct. 14, 2014).
64
History of UNHCR: A Global Humanitarian Organization of Humble Origins, UNHCR,
http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646cbc.html (last visited July 31, 2014).
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reduction of statelessness along with the protection of stateless individuals.65
Along with the UDHR, several other instruments have recognized the right
to a nationality, including the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child,66
the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,67 and the 1965
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.68
However, the UDHR has been criticized as having no practical validity since
few of its provisions are directly enforceable.69 For instance, the right to
seek asylum is unenforceable since there is no corresponding obligation on
any state to grant asylum.70
The 1954 Statelessness Convention established a definition of
statelessness and enumerated several rights that stateless persons are entitled
to have.71 The 1954 Statelessness Convention established “an internationally
recognized status for stateless persons which extend[ed] to them specific
rights . . . [including] issuance of identity and travel documents.”72
However, stateless persons in states which are not a party to the 1954
Statelessness Convention would remain unprotected.73
Subsequently, the 1961 Statelessness Convention, which expanded on the
1954 Statelessness Convention, addressed the issues of avoiding
statelessness as well as resolving conflicts concerning nationality.74 Articles
65
UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES GLOBAL LEARNING CENTER, SELF-STUDY
MODULE ON STATELESSNESS 12 (2012), available at http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/50b8996
02.pdf; see also GLOBAL TRENDS 2012, supra note 12, at 29.
66
Convention on the Rights of the Child arts. 7–8, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3.
67
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 24, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
68
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination art. 5,
Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195; DIV. OF INT’L PROT., UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR
REFUGEES, UNHCR ACTION TO ADDRESS STATELESSNESS 6 (2010), available at http://www.re
fworld.org/pdfid/50b80b899602.pdf; see also GLOBAL TRENDS 2012, supra note 12, at 29.
69
Sawyer, supra note 46, at 74–75.
70
Id. at 76.
71
1954 Statelessness Convention, supra note 11; Price, supra note 40, at 448.
72
UNHCR ACTION TO ADDRESS STATELESSNESS, supra note 68, at 5.
73
Sawyer, supra note 46, at 80; 1954 Statelessness Convention, supra note 11 (as of
November 2013, the United States is not a signatory, and the only non-signatory E.U. Member
States are as follows: Cyprus, Estonia, Malta, and Poland. A complete list is available on the
U.N. website at: http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20I/Chapter%20V/
V-3.en.pdf).
74
1961 Statelessness Convention, supra note 43 (as of November 2013, the United States is
not a signatory and the only non-signatory E.U. Member States are as follows: Cyprus,
Estonia, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland, and Spain. A complete list is available on
the U.N. website at: http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20I/Chapter%20
V/V-4.en.pdf); see also Jessica Parra, Note, Stateless Roma in the European Union:
Reconciling the Doctrine of Sovereignty Concerning Nationality Laws with International
Agreements to Reduce and Avoid Statelessness, 34 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1666, 1674 (2011)
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1 through 4 of the 1961 Statelessness Convention set forth nationality laws to
prevent statelessness among children.75 Specifically, Article 1 of the 1961
Statelessness Convention asserts that a “Contracting State shall grant its
nationality to a person born in its territory who would otherwise be
stateless.”76 Note that if a state employing jus sanguinis were to adopt the
1961 Statelessness Convention, Article 1 would effectively solve the
problem of statelessness carrying over to subsequent generations discussed
above.77 Articles 8 and 9 address deprivation of nationality, establishing that
states cannot deprive individuals of nationality based on discriminatory
factors or in such a manner that would result in statelessness.78 In terms of
enforceability, Article 11 envisioned the establishment of an international
body for reviewing individual claims to the benefits of the 1961 Statelessness
Convention.79 No such body was ever created, however, and there is no
system in place today for an individual to receive assistance in obtaining a
valid nationality.80
The International Court of Justice was established in 1945 by the U.N.
Charter and is the principal U.N. judicial organ.81 Even though the Court is
not bound by its precedent,82 it often adheres to it, making its prior decisions
relevant to analysis of the developments in international law. In the 1955
Nottebohm Case, the Court stated that “it is for every sovereign State[ ] to
settle by its own legislation the rules relating to the acquisition of its
nationality. . . .”83 In other words, as the judgment in Nottebohm put it,
“nationality is within the domestic jurisdiction of the State.”84 The Court
went on to define nationality as “a legal bond having as its basis a social fact
(noting the principle objectives of the 1961 Convention were to circumvent statelessness and
clarify nationality).
75
1961 Statelessness Convention, supra note 43, arts. 1–4; UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R
FOR REFUGEES, PREVENTING AND REDUCING STATELESSNESS: THE 1961 CONVENTION ON THE
REDUCTION OF STATELESSNESS 4 (2010), available at http://www.unhcr.org/4ca5937d9.html.
76
1961 Statelessness Convention, supra note 43, art. 1.
77
See supra Part II.B.
78
1961 Statelessness Convention, supra note 43, arts. 8–9.
79
Id. art. 11 (“The Contracting States shall promote the establishment within the
framework of the United Nations . . . of a body to which a person claiming the benefit of this
Convention may apply for the examination of his claim and for assistance in presenting it to
the appropriate authority.”).
80
Sawyer, supra note 46, at 80.
81
The Court, INT’L COURT OF JUSTICE, http://www.icj-cij.org/court/index.php?p1=1 (last
visited Nov. 18, 2013).
82
Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, June 26, 1945, 3 Bevans 1179,
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0#CHAPTER_II.
83
Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4, 20 (Apr. 6).
84
Id.
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of attachment, a genuine connection of existence, interests and sentiments,
together with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties.”85 In response to
the definition, Caroline Sawyer, a Senior Law Lecturer at New Zealand’s
Victoria University Wellington,86 wrote in 2011: “Statelessness is the
obverse [of nationality], describing a position of detachment, exclusion and
abandonment. . . . [C]itizenship still provides the means through which
[universal basic human] rights may be vindicated. The correlation of this is
that those without a nationality may in practice be excluded from human
rights.”87 A state’s decision regarding its nationality laws have a substantial
impact on the number of stateless persons excluded from basic human rights
that found within its borders.
III. ANALYSIS
This Note will now turn to an examination of current U.S. and E.U. laws
and policy on the issue of stateless persons. Examination of the differences
in the legal framework will aid in understanding the implications of the laws
and policies in place.
A. U.S. Laws and Policies
The United States is an advocate for addressing the challenges of
statelessness. The U.S. is the single largest donor to the UNHCR, which is
tasked with protecting stateless individuals.88 In December 2011, then
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton committed the Obama Administration to
the enactment of statelessness legislation in the U.S., and a taskforce on
statelessness was created by the Department of State.89 In addition to
attempting to change domestic policies on statelessness, the U.S. has taken
on the issue at the international level.90 Secretary Clinton “urged countries to
tackle a major cause of statelessness — nationality laws that discriminate
85

Id. at 23.
STATELESSNESS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 35, at i, vii.
87
Sawyer, supra note 46, at 69.
88
NICOLE GREEN & TODD PIERCE, COMBATING STATELESSNESS: A GOVERNMENT PERSPECTIVE,
35 (2009), available at http://www.fmreview.org/FMRpdfs/FMR32/34-35.pdf; see also
Statelessness, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/j/prm/policyissues/issues/c50242.htm
(last visited Oct. 2, 2013).
89
Mark Leon Goldberg, American Immigration Reform May Finally Help ‘Stateless’
People, UN DISPATCH (May 9, 2013), http://www.undispatch.com/american-immigration-refo
rm-may-finally-help-stateless-people.
90
Id.
86

2014]

NO COUNTRY FOR SOME MEN?

291

against women.”91 She also has stated: “In this compromised state [of
statelessness], women and children are vulnerable to abuse and exploitation,
including gender-based violence, trafficking in persons, and arbitrary arrest
and detention.”92 Clinton’s sentiment seems to suggest that such perilous
conditions must be avoided whenever possible.
Despite assertions by some Obama Administration officials of a need to
resolve the statelessness problem, the U.S. has taken no concrete action.93 In
population estimates from March 2012, the Department of Homeland
Security estimated that as of 2011, 11.5 million people in the U.S. were
unauthorized migrants.94 The number of stateless individuals is unknown.95
The UNHCR estimated in a 2012 report that there were several hundred
stateless individuals in the U.S., but noted that the actual number could be
significantly higher.96 For instance, U.S. Rep. Lamar Smith maintained in a
2011 hearing before the Subcommittee on Immigration Policy and
Enforcement of U.S. House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary
that “between 2009 and 2011 the U.S. government released almost 10,000
deportees after their purported countries of origin refused to take them back,”
making them de facto stateless.97
1. Current Legal Framework
The 1958 U.S. Supreme Court case Trop v. Dulles concerned a person
who became stateless when the U.S. revoked his citizenship as a punishment
for wartime desertion.98 The Court condemned statelessness, and held that
such a punishment was a violation of the prohibition set out in the Eighth
91

Katie Nguyen, Discriminatory Laws Leave Stateless Women Open to Abuse – US,
THOMSON REUTERS FOUND. (Dec. 7, 2011), http://www.trust.org/item/?map=discriminatorylaws-leave-stateless-women-open-to-abuse-us.
92
Id.
93
Greg Sargent, A Way Forward on Immigration Reform?, WASH. POST (Oct. 18, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2013/10/18/a-way-forward-on-immigr
ation-reform/.
94
MICHAEL HOEFER ET AL., ESTIMATES OF THE UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION
RESIDING IN THE UNITED STATES: JANUARY 2011, at 1 (2012), available at https://www.dhs.
gov/sites/default/files/publications/ois_ill_pe_2011.pdf.
95
Price, supra note 40, at 443.
96
The Stateless in the United States, CTR. FOR MIGRATION STUDIES (May 28, 2013), http://
cmsny.org/the-stateless-in-the-united-states/.
97
Id.; see also Keep Our Communities Safe Act: Hearing on H.R. 1932 Before the
Subcomm. on Immigration Policy and Enforcement of the Justice of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg66
539/html/CHRG-112hhrg66539.htm.
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Amendment to the Constitution against cruel and unusual punishment.99
Chief Justice Earl Warren, writing for the plurality, said that to render a
person stateless is “a form of punishment more primitive than torture” and
that it amounts to a “total destruction of the individual’s status in organized
society.”100 The plurality went on to say that this condition of statelessness,
the loss of the “right to have rights,” is “deplored in the international
community,” such that the “civilized nations of the world are in virtual
unanimity that statelessness is not to be imposed as punishment for crime.”101
Surely, then, it should not be imposed on those who have committed no
crime.
In two more recent judgments—Zadvydas v. Davis, decided in 2001,102
and Clark v. Martinez, decided in 2005103—the Supreme Court ruled that
stateless persons could not be held in detention indefinitely under the
Immigration and Nationality Act.104 After six months of detention, the
burden shifts to the U.S. to establish by clear and convincing evidence the
likelihood of removal through deportation in the reasonably foreseeable
future.105 While there is some precedent on the issue, according to a 2013
report by the Center for Migration Studies, U.S. policy on statelessness
“lacks a consistent legal framework for dealing with stateless individuals,
leaving many in protracted deportation proceedings and exposing many more
to exploitation by employers, landlords, and law enforcement officials.”106
For Mikhail Sebastian and the many like him, living under the current
U.S. legal framework for stateless persons is nothing short of a nightmare.107
Before Sebastian found himself on American Samoa for fifteen months,
another bizarre turn of events led Sebastian to the U.S. Sebastian, an ethnic
Armenian, was born in Nagorno-Karabakh, a disputed territory in
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Azerbaijan, while it was under Soviet rule.108 After the collapse of the
Soviet Union, both Armenia and Azerbaijan refused to recognize Sebastian
as their citizen.109 After three years of living with what Sebastian referred to
as “discrimination, harassment and fear,” Sebastian came to the U.S. on a
travel visa and subsequently filed a petition for asylum, which was denied.110
U.S. efforts to deport him failed, however, because he was a citizen of no
country and no country wanted to accept him.111 After spending six months
in jail, Sebastian was released, given a worker’s permit, and required to
report to the Department of Homeland Security every three months.112
During the sixteen years Sebastian lived in the United States before he found
himself trapped on American Samoa, however, Sebastian was required every
year to reapply for the worker’s permit, a lengthy and expensive process that
entailed taking time off work and thus risking the loss of his job.113
Throughout all of this, Sebastian lived in fear of “being thrown into
immigration detention at any time, even though [he had] broken no laws.”114
Sebastian, and others like him, offer a very vivid portrayal of the
deficiencies in U.S. immigration laws and policies which allow innocent
people—people whose only crime is statelessness—to fall through the
cracks. 115
With respect to international law, the U.S. is neither a signatory to the
1954 Statelessness Convention nor is it a signatory to the 1961 Statelessness
Convention.116 Thus, the United States is not bound by any of the provisions
in either of these conventions. Other international conventions are also
relevant here. The 1962 American Convention on Human Rights recognizes
the right of every person to have a nationality in Article 20.117 Article 20
goes on to confer a jus soli right for a stateless individual, so that an
individual has the right to the nationality of the state where he was born “if
he does not have the right to any other nationality.”118 Additionally, Article
20 states: “No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality or of the
108
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right to change it.”119 The United States signed but never ratified the
American Convention on Human Rights.120
The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (the 1951
Refugee Convention) defines the term refugee and sets forth a
“comprehensive codification of the rights of refugees at the international
level.”121 Article 1 defines refugees as persons who are unwilling or unable
to avail themselves to the protections of their countries of nationality or
origin, due to a “well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion.”122 The 1951 Refugee Convention was originally limited in scope
to affected persons in the aftermath of the Second World War. But the 1967
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees extended the scope of the 1951
Refugee Convention to eliminate the “geographical and temporal limits,”
thus allowing for “universal coverage.”123 The U.S. signed the Protocol in
1967, and subsequently enacted legislation that incorporated its central
provisions.124 This is significant in that the individuals who are considered
to be both refugees and stateless persons receive some amount of
protection—like the ability to obtain travel documents.125 Those who are
only stateless, however, are left without protection.
2. Attempted Legislation
a. Comprehensive Immigration Reform
In June of 2013, the Senate passed the Border Security, Economic
Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act (Immigration
Modernization Act).126 The bill awaited consideration by the House of
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Representatives, but was never brought to the floor for a vote.127 Stateless
persons and their status are mentioned in § 3405 of the Immigration
Modernization Act, which is designed to amend 8 U.S.C. § 1151.128 This
amendment, if enacted, would allow stateless persons to apply for
conditional lawful status at the discretion of either the Secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security or the Attorney General.129 This
discretion includes situations involving humanitarian issues and family
unity.130 One year after the granting of conditional status, the stateless
individual may apply for lawful permanent residence in the U.S., subject to
other prerequisites.131
Whether Congress will pass comprehensive immigration reform remains
uncertain. Further, it is unclear if such a reform would include the
Immigration Modernization Act’s statelessness language, if any language at
all. If the Immigration Modernization Act or a similar bill were to pass in a
“piecemeal” fashion,132 statelessness could be left out entirely. Note that
Senator Charles Grassley, the current chairman of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, which has jurisdiction over the Act, offered an amendment to the
Immigration Modernization Act with the stated purpose of striking the
stateless provision from the bill.133 In addition, President Obama expressed
willingness to accept the “piecemeal” approach suggested by House
Republicans for passing the immigration reform.134 Either scenario would be
detrimental for stateless persons in the U.S. Striking the statelessness
provision would leave countless stateless individuals without any path to
citizenship or to a lawful status. Similarly, using a piecemeal approach will
lower the likelihood of a statelessness provision like § 3405 passing on its
own, as opposed to as part of a package deal.
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b. Refugee Protection Act
In March 2013, Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-VT) reintroduced the Refugee
Protection Act (S. 645) in the U.S. Senate and Rep. Zoe Lofgren (D-CA)
introduced a companion bill in the U.S. House of Representatives.135 The
statelessness protection provision of the Immigration Modernization Act is
almost identical to Section 7 of the Refugee Protection Act. Both allow for
the possibility of stateless persons attaining conditional lawful status with the
potential of eventually receiving lawful permanent residence after a year, if
certain conditions are met.136 The Refugee Protection Act is intended to pass
as part of the comprehensive immigration reform, and would improve U.S.
protections for refugee and asylum seekers.137
c. Problems with Proposed Language
There are several problems with § 3405 of the Immigration
Modernization Act that need to be addressed. First, the language of the bill
is very broad and leaves too much discretion in the hands of government
authorities.
For example, § 210A(a)(2) gives the Secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security the discretion to designate specific groups
of individuals as stateless for purposes of the section.138 Section 210A(b)(1)
gives discretion to the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security
and the Attorney General to provide the conditional lawful status discussed
above if certain conditions are met.139 Other portions of § 210A assert that
the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security “may authorize an
alien . . . to engage in employment in the United States,” “may issue
appropriate travel documents,” and, most importantly, “may adjust the status
of an alien granted conditional lawful status . . . to that of an alien lawfully
admitted for permanent residence.”140
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Along these same lines, the bill fails to define certain key terms. For
instance, there is no definition for the term “conditional lawful status” or
“lawful permanent residence” in the text of § 3405 or elsewhere in the bill.
Furthermore, § 3405 is the only section in which the term “conditional lawful
status” is used.141 Such failure can result in a lack of clarity as to the rights a
stateless individual has under a conditional lawful status and when that status
can be converted into a lawful permanent residence, also known as a “green
card.”142
Lastly, the path to citizenship in § 3405—namely, acquiring conditional
lawful status, followed by lawful permanent residence—is unique. No other
class of people is required to follow such path. This can arguably lead to
arbitrary application of the section and a lack of information for stateless
persons regarding their rights under the conditional lawful status propounded
by the bill.
B. E.U. Laws and Policies
The European Union was created after the Second World War by the
Treaty of Paris founding the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952,
and today consists of twenty-eight member states.143 In 1992, the Treaty of
Maastricht, also known as the Treaty on European Union, created European
citizenship.144 The Treaty on European Union was subsequently amended by
both the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 and the Treaty of Lisbon in 2007,145
but the basic features, rights, and benefits of E.U. citizenship were preserved
in each.146 There are several rights that E.U. citizenship confers on its
citizens: the right to freely move and reside within the member states,147 the
right to vote and stand in municipal elections in the member state where the
citizen resides, regardless of whether he is a national of that state,148 the right
to the diplomatic and consular protection of other member states within the
141
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territory of a third country,149 as well as the right to petition the European
Parliament.150 However, in order to be considered a citizen of the E.U., you
must first be a citizen in one of the member states.151 This means that since
there is a lack of uniformity in nationality laws throughout the E.U.,152 states
can essentially decide whether an individual enjoys both the privileges of
citizenship of their state as well as E.U. citizenship, or neither. The potential
implications of this member state sovereignty in making their own
nationality and citizenship laws on stateless persons is vast—each individual
state is free to decide whether or not stateless persons will have a path to
citizenship.
1. European-Specific Treaties
In the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), Article 3 of
Protocol 4 establishes the right of an individual to enter the country of that
Article 4 further prohibits the collective
individual’s nationality.153
expulsion of foreigners.154 By the 1980s, with the emergence of mass
migration, and as unwanted immigration became politicized, the application
of the 1951 Refugee Convention and the ECHR in European states became
more contested in cases dealing with non-nationals.155
There are some indications that the E.U. does not give all its member
states complete sovereignty over their nationality laws. As the 1997
European Convention on Nationality establishes in Article 4, each state’s
rules on nationality shall be based on certain principles—including the
principle that “statelessness” shall be avoided.156 Article 6, which discusses
the acquisition of nationality in member states, asserts that the internal law of
said member states shall provide a means for acquiring nationality for
individuals found in its territory that would otherwise be stateless.157 Article
8 further states that each state shall allow renunciation of its nationality as
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long as that renunciation does not result in statelessness,158 and Article 9
goes on to say that the states shall allow recovery of nationality in their
internal law for its former nationals who are “lawfully and habitually”
residing in the state.159
In the 2006 Treaty Establishing the European Community (the EC
Treaty), Article 12 prohibits any discrimination based on nationality.160
Article 13 of the EC Treaty authorizes the European Union to take action to
combat discrimination based on racial or ethnic origin, among other
things.161 This could potentially give the E.U. authority to protect those that
are stateless in their member states.
The Race Directive of 2000 arose out of Article 13 of the EC Treaty,
which deals with combating various forms of discrimination.162 The Race
Directive’s stated purpose is to help to combat racial and ethnic
discrimination.163 The Directive does not, however, apply to “difference[s]
of treatment based on nationality” and to “any treatment which arises from
the legal status of the third-country nationals and stateless persons
concerned.”164 This means that member states can refuse to grant individuals
nationality on the basis of race or ethnicity.165
In the 2010 case Rottman v. Bayern, the European Court of Justice held
that Germany’s deprivation of nationality, in a case in which nationality had
been obtained by deception, was legal under E.U. law, even if it resulted in
statelessness and loss of E.U. citizenship.166 This reaffirmed Article 7 of the
1997 European Convention on Nationality discussed above, which states that
a member state’s internal law cannot result in the loss of nationality such that
a person would become stateless, except if the nationality was acquired by
“fraudulent conduct, false information or concealment of any relevant fact
attributable to the applicant.”167 Other than this single exception, however,
Article 7 states that such internal laws, including those that lead to
statelessness, are prohibited.168
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2. Differences in Nationality Laws Among EU Member States
Several countries, including Germany, Austria, and Italy, determine
nationality based on jus sanguinis rather than jus soli.169 This jus sanguinis
framework implies that there is a potential for multiple generations of
stateless persons.170 A closer look into the nationality laws of France, the
United Kingdom, Slovenia, and Estonia will illustrate the broad range of
differences and the impact of such differences on the stateless individuals in
each of the countries respectively.
a. France: Double Jus Soli and the Expulsion of Roma
France currently has a “double jus soli” system along with its jus
sanguinis system.171 The “double jus soli” system requires two generations
in order to establish nationality based on jus soli.172 In a pure “double jus
soli” system, statelessness would be limited to two generations instead of
one. Under the jus sanguinis system in France, a child, regardless of where
he is born, can claim French nationality if one parent is French at the time of
their birth.173 France goes even further than this by allowing for citizenship
when an individual is born in France and is still living there once they reach
eighteen years of age.174 For foreigners, naturalization is technically possible
after five years of residence, but is more reliable in such a short period if the
foreigner’s spouse is a French national.175 Further, a newer citizen can be
deprived of citizenship if he or she commits certain crimes within ten years
of his or her naturalization.176 French law also allows renunciation of
citizenship as long as such renunciation does not leave the individual
stateless.177
French law and policy, however, are not without its problems. In 2003,
two laws were passed that restricted naturalization by allowing for exclusion
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of undesirable foreigners from the naturalization process.178 This policy of
“selective immigration” led to the requirement of a “reception and
integration contract” in 2008, which fundamentally is just an agreement to
assimilate.179 In addition to the fact that language qualifications for
naturalization were strengthened in 2003 and 2005, the “integration contract”
codified these requirements in 2007.180
Most notably, President François Hollande’s Administration continued to
“forcibly evict Roma from settlements as well as expel Roma of foreign
origin from France.”181 The Roma, commonly referred to as “gypsies,” have
been subjected to discrimination throughout history and today the Roma are
often targets of violence.182 Tens of thousands of Roma live in Europe with
no rights and no nationality.183 Many of them are stateless.184 Many contend
that France’s evictions of the Romani people violate their human rights and
“fail to comply with both French and European Union law.”185 Despite these
pressures, it is unlikely that the Hollande Administration will change its
policy because the expulsion of migrant Roma “remains a politically popular
policy in France.”186
b. The United Kingdom: Revoking Citizenship from Terror Suspects
The United Kingdom, in April 2013, adopted a new statelessness
procedure in Part 14 of the Immigration Rules. It allows stateless individuals
a route to having their stateless status recognized as well as legalizing their
presence.187 According to statements made by UNHCR spokesperson
Melissa Fleming at a 2013 press briefing, a key feature of the new procedure
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is that it allows for the determination of whether or not the individual is in
fact stateless.188 The new procedure does not apply to the de facto stateless.
Once that person has taken sufficient steps to gain recognition as a national
under the laws of their state, however, they are then considered to be de jure
stateless rather than de facto stateless and fall within the new protections of
Part 14.189 Thus, a person who is de jure stateless and present in the U.K.
can benefit from the new rule, as long as they meet the international
definition of a stateless person as set forth by the 1954 Statelessness
Convention and are not excluded.190 The stateless individual may be
excluded for a number of reasons, including: individuals who are already
receiving U.N. assistance, individuals believed to have committed war
crimes, the existence of reasonable grounds to believe the individual is a
security threat to the U.K., or there is another country in which they would
be admitted.191 No legal aid is available to help individuals with their
stateless application.192 When applying for a grant of leave to remain in the
U.K. with stateless status, an individual is given a leave period of thirty
months and can apply for extension.193 After five years of leave to remain,
an individual may apply for indefinite leave to remain and, eventually, may
apply for naturalization, provided that the necessary requirements are met.194
If an individual’s stateless application is refused, there is no specific right to
appeal but the refusal may be subject to judicial review in some instances.195
In October 2013, the U.K. Supreme Court decided the case of Secretary
of State for the Home Department v. Al-Jedda, concerning a December 2007
order by the Secretary of State purporting to deprive Al-Jedda of his U.K.
citizenship.196 In September 2004, Al-Jedda traveled from the U.K. to Iraq
where he was arrested by U.S. forces in October 2004.197 He was held in
Iraq for three years by British forces due to his suspected involvement with a
terrorist organization.198 The 1981 British Nationality Act states that “[t]he
188
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Secretary of State may not make an order . . . if he is satisfied that the order
would make a person stateless.”199 The U.K. Supreme Court examined the
UDHR, and the 1954 and 1961 Statelessness Conventions, along with other
instruments of international law, recognizing the “evil of statelessness” and
the right to a nationality.200 The Court eventually held that the order violated
the 1981 British Nationality Act and rejected the Secretary of State’s
argument that it was Al-Jedda’s failure to apply to regain his Iraqi
citizenship, not the order, which caused Al-Jedda to be stateless.201
More recently, Theresa May, who is the Home Secretary, expressed a
desire to bring legislation that would allow the confiscation of U.K.
citizenship from any suspected terrorist whose conduct is “seriously
prejudicial to the interests of the UK,” without regard for those U.K. citizens
without dual nationalities that would be left stateless.202 Under current law,
the Home Secretary has the power to strip individuals of U.K. citizenship if
they are dual-nationals, but May wants to find a way around domestic and
international rules in order to strip terror suspects of their U.K. citizenship,
even if doing so would leave those individuals stateless.203 In the 1950s and
1960s, when most western countries denounced denaturalization, Britain did
not do so, although it rarely utilized this power.204 Post-9/11, however, there
was an increase in the utilization of this power, and in 2006 an act was
passed lowering the requirements for revocation of citizenship from both
naturalized and native-born citizens.205
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c. Slovenia: A State in Transition
The recently established Republic of Slovenia (1991) provides an
interesting case study because of the problems stemming from the unusually
high number of state transitions occurring in a relatively short period of
time.206 Some 200,000 people became de facto stateless after the transition
from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) to the Republic of
Slovenia because their personal documents were destroyed or invalidated,
leading to their expulsion.207 Article 40 of the Citizenship of the Republic of
Slovenia Act sets forth the conditions for naturalization in Slovenia, stating
that if a citizen of another republic that registered permanent residence in
Slovenia on the day of the plebiscite of independence and has actually been
living in Slovenia, and has filed an application within six months of the Act’s
entry into force, then he shall acquire citizenship in the Republic of
Slovenia.208 After gaining independence, citizenship and alien policies left
25,671 long-term immigrants from other SFRY republics without citizenship
and denied them status as legal aliens.209 Once the six month window set
forth in Article 40 closed, not all who applied for citizenship under the
Article were accepted—some were rejected and others did not apply due to a
number of reasons, mainly false information about the application process.210
The Aliens Act of 1991 laid out various policies applicable to foreigners
entering Slovenia, but did not address those who became stateless due to
secession.211 Those that did not become citizens in 1991 were “secretly
erased from the register of permanent residents,” an action that became
known as “erasure.”212 Under the 1991 Aliens Act, erased persons were
treated as any other foreign citizen and many could not meet the required
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criteria of the Act.213 The result was a very significant detriment to the rights
of the individuals who were subject to erasure—they lacked valid documents
for identification and often their legal status was revoked, leaving them
without access to the most basic rights.214
d. Estonia: Where the Stateless Have Rights
Estonia is also worthy of examination since de jure statelessness is
relatively common there due to its nationality laws.215 Between 1992 and
2009, about 150,000 persons were naturalized in Estonia, with about 100,000
remaining stateless non-citizens.216 Compared to other member states of the
E.U., Estonia’s citizenship policies are much more restrictive.217 Generally,
stateless non-citizens enjoy the same rights and free access to social
protection as citizens in Estonia.218 Most of the discrimination that occurs
against stateless non-citizens is based on their Russian cultural background,
rather than their legal status.219
3. Statelessness Determination Procedures
Some E.U. member states are moving towards establishing determination
procedures to ascertain the status of stateless individuals within their
borders.220 Some states delegate the determination authority to already
existing authorities.221 For instance, France, Spain, and the U.K. have
delegated statelessness determination to their asylum authorities.222
Additionally, these member states do not require lawful presence of a
stateless individual before they are entitled to a status determination
213
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procedure.223 This is positive because it encourages efficiency in status
determination and does not negatively impact or deter individuals who may
not have any lawful status.224
C. Lessons from the European Union
There are lessons that the United States can take away from this
examination of various European Union member states. First, the U.S. is
already better situated to eradicate statelessness due to its use of jus soli for
acquiring citizenship. However, this does not mean that the United States
should ignore the current stateless population simply because the problem is
limited to one generation. Rather, it should recognize the limited burden of
providing these law-abiding individuals with a legal presence so that they no
longer have to be treated as second-class citizens.
Second, as we see with France and the United Kingdom, statelessness can
be a serious problem, even in the most developed western nations. Of
course, the U.S. is not expelling stateless individuals in a discriminatory way
as the French are doing to the Romani people, nor is it purposely revoking
citizenship from individuals suspected of terrorism like in the U.K.
However, many stateless persons in the U.S. are still being deprived of their
most basic and fundamental human rights. The U.S. should serve as an
example for both developing and developed nations alike by, at the very
least, establishing status determination procedures and granting stateless
persons some kind of path to obtaining legal status so that they can enjoy
basic human rights such as access to healthcare, education, and the freedom
of movement.
Lastly, as alluded to above, it is important to realize that this is an
international legal issue. Statelessness exists in developed and developing
countries alike, and the far-reaching consequences of statelessness impact
more than just the nations that are allowing it. Many of the individuals who
are stateless in the U.S. and the E.U. are valuable members of their
communities. If those individuals were granted the rights to travel and work,
they would benefit their respective countries economically as well as
socially.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS
A. Implications of Proposed Legislation Passing
Congress should pass comprehensive immigration reform that includes a
statelessness provision. While the language in the Immigration Modernization
Act is incomplete in some areas, passing a comprehensive immigration reform
bill including § 3405 or something comparable would be a step in the right
direction; it would relieve some of the pressure on the stateless population in
the United States since it would at least allow stateless individuals to obtain a
permanent legal status. Ideally, the broad and deferential language in the
legislation would be reworded so as to minimize confusion and endow
stateless individuals with clear and discernible rights. If nothing else, the term
“conditional lawful status” needs to be further defined so that it is clear what
rights it confers onto individuals who are granted that status.
B. Implications of Proposed Legislation Not Passing and the Alternatives
If comprehensive immigration reform legislation does not pass, the
prospect for stateless persons receiving any lawful status in the U.S. is slim,
at best. But the most plausible course of action seems to be legislation,
which will be unlikely to make it through Congress if it is not presented in
conjunction with an immigration reform package.
One alternative is to separate the legislation on statelessness from the
greater immigration reform bill and try to pass it on its own. With this
alternative, a bill with language similar to that of § 3405 is unlikely to garner
enough support in Congress. Congressional Democrats greatly favor
comprehensive immigration reform, recognizing that many of the current
issues in immigration law are greatly intertwined.
A second alternative is U.S. accession to the 1954 and 1961 Statelessness
Conventions. However, it is not enough to just sign on to these
Conventions—the United Kingdom is a signatory of both but that has not
stopped it from acting in contradiction to those conventions recently, as
discussed above. The U.S. would have to ratify the treaty and enact enabling
legislation before being bound by the terms of these Conventions.
A third alternative is the adoption of something similar to the 1997
European Convention on Nationality—a law that would construe nationality
laws so as to avoid statelessness and would provide a means for acquiring
citizenship for those individuals who would otherwise be stateless, except in
cases of fraud. Effectively, this kind of law would do the same thing as the
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Immigration Modernization Act would if it were enacted, but would most
likely have a harder time finding approval from Congress on its own as
opposed to when presented in a package of comprehensive immigration
reform.
Another alternative would be to create stateless determination procedures
like those that exist in the E.U. The authority to make status decisions could
potentially be delegated to immigration courts. This new authority, however,
would likely need Congressional approval as well.
Because deep uncertainties are inherent in these other alternatives,
passage of a comprehensive immigration reform bill is the best chance for
stateless persons to obtain a path to citizenship. The four alternatives listed
above would be viable if they could pass through Congress standing alone,
but this seems unlikely. While the language of the bill is somewhat
ambiguous, the ability to obtain a conditional lawful status and lawful
permanent residence thereafter is better than the current state of affairs,
which does not allow for stateless persons to ever be granted citizenship.
Thus, at this point in time, the passage of a comprehensive immigration
reform bill, ideally with more favorable language, is the most viable solution
for beginning to solve the problem of statelessness in the United States.

